Existential neuroscience and autonoesis

I read a remarkable article by Marco Iacoboni in Social Neuroscience entitled “The Quiet Revolution in Existential Neuroscience”.  Instead of ‘quiet’ I wish it would be quite loud.  It makes for some dense reading but worth every nerve impulse to do so.  His main argument seems to be that instead of doing neuroscience based on the assumptions that the subjective and objective worlds are clearly delineated and that the subjective world is based upon representations which have been constructed through the accretion of analyzed elements (some pragmatic truth in that), our neuroscience should be based upon “the view of a human brain that needs a body to exist in a world of shared social norms in which meaning originates from being-in-the-world”.  What is important to our minds is not so much the analytic synthesis but the embodied context of experience.  Hey now, I can get behind that one.

Iacoboni marshals evidence for this view from a variety of research, especially studies into the frontoparietal mirror system.  (The frontal lobe has motoric functions that light up when we see someone doing something and the parietal lobe has perceptual and body schema functions that contribute to this mirroring).  Some studies show that mirroring emotions both incidentally and intentionally invokes not just the mirrored expressive actions but also the emotional processes themselves in the limbic system.  We mirror each other automatically on an almost continuous basis and that this leads to (I really like this next part) “a process according to which a certain intimacy is achieved . . . . . What is this intimacy if not the interdependence of both parties”.  What is emphasized here is not our separateness but our communal feelings. Mirroring helps us identify with and understand the other’s intention and emotional state.  This plays, of course, an important role in ‘mentalizing’ about others, what I call EC for Empathy Central and others label it ToM for Theory of Mind.

There is a lot more about this to be said but I want to explore another remarkable idea.  Iacoboni sees our minds interpreting much of our experience in context.  The same actions occur in many situations, so that to understand the other’s acts requires the inclusion of context in our deliberations.  (Be still, O my heart).  If I read him correctly, one major feature of any context is the degree of personal relevance; some situations are impersonal, i.e., without emotional engagement or involvement (think of doing things as a matter of course), and some are more personal, i.e., their emotional involvement leads to episodic memories (the experience is important enough to remember as an autobiographical episode of your life).  Experiences that are important to the self are autonoetic, as was discussed in my recent post 8/22/18, and autonoesis has many implications.


DMPFC=dorsomedial prefrontal cortex MPC=medial parietal cortex. Illustration provided by Georg Northoff – Georg Northoff  Brain and self – a neurophilosophical account Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health 2013, 7:28.

Most amazingly, Iacoboni identifies two structures relevant to the mirroring system, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the medial parietal cortex, that light up when the experience is autonoetic (my interpretation).  For example, these two areas are silent during artificial laboratory tasks that have little ecological validity but they become more active when the task is social in a meaningful way.  Iacoboni says our ‘default state’ is to think socially and these two areas help in the ongoing social thinking needed to relate in a authentic, i.e., not rote or cant, manner.  To refer back to his earlier notion, these areas light up more when the situation’s import is based upon intimacy, i.e., engagement with the other, than when the situation is socially sterile.

Now, if you have followed my blog somewhat closely for more than a few months, you may already have a sense of how my dorsomedial prefrontal and medial parietal cortices are fired up.  Consider one of Iacoboni’s preliminary research finding that these areas light up when political aficionados discuss politics and grow dark when politically naïve or disinterested people do so.  I take this to mean that some of us feel politics is relevant to our lives and some do not.  Some do because they are cognitively engaged in issues and some do only because of the chameleon effect, i.e., they are responding by fitting in through social imitation and emotional contagion.  If you have done any phone canvassing for a candidate you might recall conversations based on positions, conversations based upon an emotional identification, and some when the person could care less.

Now consider a study posted about here on 4/18/18 that demonstrated that the closer you are, i.e., developing intimacy, with colleagues and friends, the more your neural responses to watching a movie are congruent with each other.  Also consider (and it may help to re-read my 8/22/18 post) the role of autonoesis in art. My empirical question is when someone ‘gets into’ a work of art, e.g., reading a novel that is hard to put down or seeing a movie that you love, do these areas indicative of autonoesis or personal engagement, i.e., dorsomedial prefrontal medial parietal cortices, light up? If you used an instrument to assess one’s aesthetic response such as the AESTHEMOS (see post 10/31/17), would this correlate with activity in these areas?  A very interesting study there wants to be done—oh to be a younger man in a research setting.  But go one step further with me.

Aristotle in talking about drama but it applies, I think, in some way to art forms in general, says that since we know the art is not ‘factual’, i.e., couldn’t be relevant to our ‘real’ life, to engage emotionally (and aesthetically, I would say) we must have a willing suspension of disbelief.  So I wonder if such a suspension allows what I am calling these autonoetic areas to fire up, and if we find art uninvolving, e.g., we could care less about the characters or the plot of a stupid movie, do these areas remain dark?  Oh my, that is seeking the deep aesthetic in life and mind.  Travel on.


WP on art and the brain

So we have a wonderful audiovisual piece on art and the brain from the Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/lifestyle/your-brain-on-art/ . I think it gives a good accounting of how our brains do art, though of course I have some quibbles. This work gets right its emphasis that art connects us to something larger, that it uses the mirror system, that narrative is important, that key elements serve to evoke emotions and that when those elements are congruous, the emotions are evoked more strongly, and that art serves a shared consciousness.

They understand that empathy is an important component to this process. We mirror emotions just like we mirror the ballet dancer’s movements and the quality of those movements convey different emotions. Though cited without any explanation or hint as to its complexity, metaphor is deemed critical to art. They understand that we feel more strongly (by some measure—I could carry on about this a bit but not now) with tragedy. They even speak about how a “performer’s separate motions [are] one psychologically rich phrase”, which is a dim echo of Langer’s discussion of art and rhythm. Perhaps the strongest message here is that while art is “the domain of the heart” science can and should help us understand the phenomena. And I would add that understanding only increases appreciation.

Being quite prejudiced, I noticed several instances where acquaintance with Susanne Langer’s philosophy would have clarified and emboldened their explication. In a silly pique I took exception to the phrase “wordless language of symbols” when Langer gives us plenty of conceptual support to talk about presentational symbols apart from discursive linguistic ones and I think the difference is important, as you know if you have followed this blog much at all. Likewise Langer talked about artistic import (vs. linguistic meaning) emphasizing the rhythmicity of the artistic gestalt and its elements, the interplay among different artistic forms, e.g., why happy dance and sad music might not kindle the same strong emotion as sad dance and music would but then art is not about purity of emotion, is it? Perhaps most importantly she emphasized the unity of the artistic piece and the rendering of personal experience into a vital experiential gestalt; the artistic form regardless of the medium must be unified, coherent and luminous. Oh, how I wish we would understand how our scientific understanding of the roots of our humanity is traveling towards what Langer has already elucidated; progress would be surer if we followed her guidance.

One more quibble, and please remember that I do appreciate this report more than almost any other I have seen for a long time, is that this story brings forth the notion of ‘neuroaesthetics’. Yes, neuro stuff is all the new sexy rage, but I am old school, really old school and a bit cranky at that, and so make two points. One is that ours is an embodied mind, as in my basic concept here on this blog of soma, its brain and the MEMBRAIN, and so art, as a symbol of vital experience, is also embodied in its operations. Sure, our brain and MEMBRAIN are mighty conductors of communal experience but that experience is lived in the soma, i.e., the body. Watch dance, ballet, modern, flamingo or otherwise without body awareness and you will have missed the point.  Parsing the soma out of art is just another example of cognitive distortion towards the discursive and rational excluding emotion and irrationality.  This brings me to my second point which is that we never should have segregated aesthetics from its biological role in the first place; then we would never have the need to for it to be neuro because of course it is—it is biological. So, just ‘aesthetics’ will do nicely, thank you very much, because I understand the biological context of human culture and its roots in empathy and symbolization. Travel on (and look at the Post piece).

Grammatical feelings and cultural senses

I continue to work my way through Pierre Bourdieu’s Toward a Theory of Practice. Apart from the anthropology, including studies of an Arabic culture, with which I am not familiar, the dense conceptualizations he presents, and his tortured syntax, I would breeze through it, I am sure. His syntax is difficult because many sentences have many clauses embedded into the main proposition, these extra clauses reiterating previous statements to ensure, I guess, proper presentation of the complexity involved, and also enlarging upon the place of these ideas in the literature of his discipline and in a broader philosophical tradition. So, a read that demands patient energy to enjoy. With gardening season in the dog days, I have some of that some days sometimes. I keep on to understand as best I can his concept of the habitus, which is, as I have said earlier (see post 8/13/17), his take on culture, a hot topic in my mind these days.

One of his ancillary purposes here, though, is to remind us that our theories about human activity involve transforming that activity, necessarily washing out the particularities manifest in practice so as to have cleaner conceptualizations. Or as Yogi Berra said, to paraphrase, ‘In theory there is no difference between theory and practice; in practice there is’. Bourdieu uses examples in this regard from structural anthropology, e.g. Levi-Strauss, whom I did read long ago, say 1970, but he also mentions in this regard, linguistic theories. Now I come to known territory; old posts ride again.

Indeed, I posted about grammatical feelings on 10/12/14. (I will say that 2014 looks like it was a very good year for my blog; see post previous to this one as well as the 2014 post on the arcuate fasciculus, mirror neurons, and memes, a post that continues to get several hits a week—hey now!). Here is an excerpt on language: Now grammar, at its inception, derives from feelings of fitness ranging from very awkward and frozen to quite comfortable and fluent. Consider your feelings of laterality, e.g., handedness. Cross your arms, right over left then left over right. One will feel more comfortable than the other. You can repeat this with folded hands (which thumb is on top?), crossed legs, kicking a ball, swinging a bat or pulling a rake, using one eye to view through a telescope, etc. A grammarian or linguist says a sentence and then intuitively tests its fitness in a similar fashion [which is more comfortable or feels more fit?]. These feelings vary across languages and within languages by dialect and social class. We can get creative violating grammar as in Yoda-speak. These feelings of grammaticality are how we apprehend the rules governing the linear construction of words and sentences as we formulate our thoughts for communication. My old English teachers taught grammar prescriptively, helping me fit into an educated class no doubt, but linguistics uses grammar more as a descriptive tool to trace relationships among languages, the nature of embedding and recursion, historical shifts within and between languages, etc. We have been doing so for a long time. The earliest recorded grammars were by Sanskrit scholars in 6th-7th century BCE India.

My point here is to use grammatical feelings of fitness as a general analogy for how we sense what is true, what fits together better, even best, and that this is as good, as knowledgeable about truth as we can be. Science uses mathematics to test our intuitions and confirm facts objectively (consensus or probabilistically) but even here, scientists operating under different paradigms have different intuitions of fitness. Thomas Kuhn illustrated this in his writings on scientific revolutions. For many years, the mathematical differences in accuracy between the Ptolemaic solar system and the Copernican one were negligible, but the latter felt more fit and upon further study proved to be truer.   [Kuhn also said that a paradigmatic shift is not complete until the old generation dies away.] Last century physicist Paul Dirac is famous for a set of equations predicting previously unknown phenomena like the positron that were confirmed 20-30 years later, but he said at their initial formulation that they were “beautiful” and so he knew they were true. Even today some physicists challenge the standard model because some features do not feel right, and of course, our mathematical theorizing and ability to measure at increasingly smaller and larger scales has helped engender quantum physics, which leaves much of our intuition far behind. Extrapolating just a little from William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience, religions (and gods) have changed over the course of human history to meet the changing demands of humans and our society—the new ones have a better fit than the old, e.g., a spoken prayer over a blood sacrifice for example (you do prefer the former, don’t you?).

Back to 2017. I will return to Bourdieu’s habitus after this bit from Jacques Monod from my post on 3/10/17: Fitness is not just a concept of evolutionary viability anymore. It would seem to be functional principle in life’s operations, from the replication and transcription of DNA and proteins described above as based on stereotaxic fit between molecules to the grammatical compositions we use for communication (and so much more). I am fascinated by aesthetic fitness, by how the elements of an artistic work fit together coherently to form an integrated whole that shines somehow with felt life. Great art, as I think Aquinas noted so long ago, works with unity, integrity and luminosity. Not so great art misses on one or more of these three dimensions. Bad art simply appeals to some shallow stereotypical emotional response. And somehow, like linguistic structures, aesthetic works result from a composite of neural processes working together in a fit manner.

So today in 2017 we have the idea that feelings of fitness are important to our minds and further, that these feelings are strongly influenced by and are derived from our acculturation, a rich biological phenomena. Bourdieu says the habitus is an acquired set of predispositions that enable us to solve new problems in socially prompted ways; the habitus, he says, helps set what is possible, impossible, probable and acceptable in our minds. Further, he sees the habitus as bodily, as postural, or a way of living in our culture prepared to adjust from our current stance. Eye contact may be respectful, disrespectful, or incidental according to your culture and the situation.

I am fond of the phrase “embodied mind”; Bourdieu uses the phrase “socially informed body” to mean that culture begins with the social transformation of body awareness. This is very similar to Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By. We use body orientation to map reference to many concepts, e.g., truth and heaven up, lies and hell down, time progresses front to back as in what lies ahead and what is behind us now, and this list goes on quite a ways right-left, male-female, etc. And just like grammatical feelings or the stereotaxic fit between proteins, whether we operate from our socially informed body or our embodied mind, we sense what our culture tells us, so whether it feels right or wrong or on or off, we know the way of our culture by sensing the fitness. Bourdieu gives quite a list of these senses because human culture is so unbounded and diverse; he lists “ a sense of necessity and the sense of duty, the sense of reality and the sense of direction, the sense of balance and the sense of beauty, come sense and the sense of the sacred, tactical sense and the sense of responsibility, business sense and the sense of propriety, the sense of humour and the sense of the absurd, moral sense and the sense of practicality, and so.” Our ability to order the world through some sort of logic and categorization is based upon “what might be called the sense of limits and of the legitimate transgression of limits.”

This is quite a different perspective on culture than the one offered by memes as units of replication. In Bourdieu’s view culture is an internalized set of predispositions and just that as they guide our actions into culturally modeled channels. Some actions are distinctively cultural, e.g., ways of shaking hands or greeting with a kiss on both cheeks, etc., and some result in cultural products, e.g., art, laws, marriages, etc. Memes, here in this view then, are cultural artefacts, the detritus of cultural processes. Yes, they morph and evolve, but this only a reflection of the changing deep and surface structures of actual culture, the socially constructed and shared ways of thinking, feeling, and acting among the group, in much the same way language does. Reflect on the change in English terms, “named” and “yclept” that mean mostly the same thing, though naming has changed quite bit since Chaucer’s day as well, or on the difference in languages where some have nouns that are masculine or feminine.  Cultural changes are analogous to these.

I am beginning to think that ‘fitness’ is a basic feature of biological activity as I consider Monod’s stereotaxic fit between molecules that functions as the binary operations of life, thus reinforcing the idea that life is an information machine, and then evolution’s genetic change in which new genes must fit with the old ones and then must help increase adaptive fitness in order to replicate and spread, and onward to linguistic and cultural changes. Bourdieu also sees this idea as central. He says that the basic feature of all of our cultural senses is whether the action under consideration fits within the normative predisposition or outside its pale. I would add that this is yet another aspect of our biological roots. Travel on.

The heirs of Wolfgang Kohler


Wolfgang Kohler

This is Wolfgang Kohler who had a remarkable and distinguished scientific career in Germany and then America where he went to elude Nazi authorities. He was one of the founders of Gestalt psychology and coined the phrase, “The whole is different from the sum of its parts.” He understood the methodological and theoretical limits of introspection and behaviorism, and he studied chimpanzees for awhile early in his career. Thank you, Wikipedia. I refreshed my memory there because his name came up in two very different books.

I have finished re-reading Edelson and Tononi’s How Matter Becomes Imagination, and Kohler is mentioned at the very end. They discuss the necessity of incorporating values and emotions into our theories and experimentation for neuroscience if we are to understand consciousness. They conclude by citing the title of Kohler’s 1938 book, The Place of Value in a World of Fact. Their stance, especially Edelson’s, that the brain is not a computer is noteworthy in this regard. Their analysis focuses on language as a necessary condition for what they call ‘secondary consciousness’. Their ‘primary consciousness’ is what I would call sentience, and while they acknowledge that our minds are embodied in social animals, their analysis slights this facet by neglecting empathy and kinesic communication to focus on linguistic symbolization.

Now contrast their approach with that of Frans der Waals who focuses on empathy and social relations and shows a high level of consciousness amongst the simians at least. I am now deep into his newest book, Are We Smart Enough to Understand How Smart Animals Are?, and he mentions Kohler many times because Kohler advocated getting to know the species by observing and working with them based upon their natural, ecologically driven behaviors. Der Waals says at one point that a human giving human tests to children and chimpanzees in order to compare their intelligence, saying they had treated them the same, is like throwing a cat and a fish in a pool and saying they had treated them the same. Kohler was early on, say 1913, a proponent of species specific talents requiring sensitivity for studying their particular intelligences. One of the great pleasures of reading this book is der Waals’ incredible knowledge of different animals’ different behaviors and what these indicate about their cognitions.


Der Waals highlights another early scientist, Jakob von Uexkull, and his concept of the Umwelt, i.e., “the perceptual world in which an organism exists and acts as subject” (from Wikipedia). The umwelt is the beginning of signifying functions for the organism. In vertebrates the sensorium or ambient of its ecological niche is different from their umwelt which is transformed by the values placed upon or interpreted from the sensorium. Important, yes? Our umwelts differ from that of chimpanzees or bonobos not in our consciousness of others but in the prominence of our conspecific relations (this from der Waals). Mammalian umwelts differ from those of non-mammals by the prominence of social relations in general.

This is one motivation for my concept of the MEMBRAIN, that part of the brain that processes social communication. Within each MEMBRAIN a self gazes upon an umwelt filled with social objects, procedures and autobiographical memory along with information from the sensorium. With the advent of symbolic capacities the umwelt depends less upon ambient information and more upon information generated within through symbolic control. The common factor in all of this is conspecific relationships.

These two books are both excellent and quite different from each other because the science behind them is quite different. Edelson (now deceased) and Tononi, who have probably forgotten more neuroscience than I will ever know, examine brain functioning from a high theoretical perspective from where they can see neural systems energize, organize, and flow as conscious processes arise to facilitate adaptive mentation. They are quite positivistic in orientation and exemplary in their understanding of the limits such an approach meets. For example, they say that art results from consciousness but that studying the brain does not contribute much to our aesthetic understanding; they say that such contemplations yield only “trivial” contributions. Amen (and someday I might discuss this in terms of a book, Biopoetics).

Der Waals, on the other hand, studies animal behavior through observation of the species in a more natural ecological setting and through experimental designs based upon our current understanding of the animal’s umwelt. In his discussion of animal research we see the power of life as it is manifested in mental control of adaptive processes and the biological roots of our humanity. Travel on.

Embodying the mind

A common phrase these days is the “embodied mind,” and make no mistake, I am for it even though its epistemological basis is murky, for the use of ‘embodied’ carries the implication that the mind was embodied by nature, when it was, truth be told, embodied by us and that only recently in any rigorous sense beginning with Darwin’s statement that the human mind is different from the minds of other animals only by degree and not in kind. Before Darwin established that profound truth, for many centuries and countless generations, we, except for a few skeptical geniuses in ancient Greece and others like Spinoza, disembodied the mind by believing it was a spiritual manifestation from one’s god(s). I will explain below that we continue to disembody the mind today despite the advances of neuroscience, even in its service.

I have begun reading Frans de Waals’ newest book, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? In the text he says that the title should read ‘how smart other animals are’, and that he uses ‘animals’ as shorthand for all of our relatives. I must say I love his writings; he has broad humanistic knowledge and he is an excellent and rigorous scientist.   And while I acknowledge that mentioning humans and animals as if they were two separate categories is one of my pet peeves, I want to argue that the title is actually quite apt.

De Waals quotes Werner Heisenberg, one of the giants of 20th century physics as saying, “What we observe is not nature in itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning”. Here is an important epistemological observation (I think it is clearer if instead of ‘to’ he had used ‘by’ our method of questioning). Heisenberg ‘discovered’ that the act of measuring imposes limits on what can be known (either location or mass but not both) and that the act itself changes what is measured. This, it seems obvious to me, applies to our understanding the mind, so when de Waals asks if we are smart enough to understand animal intelligence, while he is mainly referring to our denigration of other animals’ minds, I think the question also includes our own minds, and our measurements are often specious given our narrow perspective. And given our current culture, especially its lack of intellectual depth as seen in our political discourse and the media’s reporting of it, I have my doubts.

When we disembodied the mind as something from god, all knowledge came from god and so we have most of medieval philosophy trying to reconcile that with Aristotle who, of course, knew different gods. Quite a dilemma. Then sometime after the Copernican revolution we went the other direction and disembodied the mind by pretending it was rational and orderly. Thus the English, who knew they were the most logical because their trains ran on time, could justify bringing civilized order to the rest of us, and now we have gone even further by disembodying the mind to be an information processing machine, i.e., our minds run by some logical algorithms, even though Freud had thrown a monkey wrench into those works a century ago when he pointed out the power of the subconscious.

I struggle to understand how so many discussions seem pointless as we talk past one another, have no common factual frame, and rarely adjust our thinking given another’s input. (Of course looking at some of that input, I wonder that we even listen). I remember Thomas Kuhn’s books on the Copernican and scientific revolutions where he says that a new paradigm comes to predominate only when the older generation who espoused the old paradigm dies off. I do understand how Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist studying moral and political discourse, came up with his article, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail,” thereby saying the tail wags the dog, i.e., logic over emotions, albit very poorly. These days I watch how our current political discourse confirms research findings that out of 32 or so modernly advantaged nations, the USA ranks 30th in educational achievement. Actually I wonder if it is really that high.

It seems clear enough that our knowledge does not come from god nor is it rational or logically based; those views arise when we disembody the mind. When we embody the mind (more on that in a future post), we find that our minds are indeed a muddy mess with all epistemology suspiciously complicated. How smart are animals? Without the talents for symbolization and making it up, other animals seem to have a clear, clean intelligence that serves them well enough to escape our clutches when they can. With those talents, whereby we disembody the mind and believe that we are more intelligent than we really are, not so much.

In my clinical training and practice I learned and endeavored to see the object whole, to stay close to the data in my interpretations, remembering by what I measured and how my perspective was lacking. Yeah, I know I will come back soon enough to how our empathy and symbolization are strengths, but right now, those are not particularly manifest in the data. So with this road sign lit up rather brilliantly by the road, “Caution: human minds at work,” travel on.

Questionable quibbles

Dr. Marder of the last post said that when we finally do map out the connectome, we will have only begun to understand the processes and their myriad forms. This brings up the old question, can a brain understand itself? Or will we forever (?) pursue this understanding the same as we do for the universe at large? Can a smaller, less complex (and differently grown or constructed) system understand the larger, more complex system? Only as a model or simulation is the easy, if incomplete answer here.

Connectome picture

Connectome picture

I have also finished E. O. Wilson’s On Human Nature, an excellent read. I very much appreciated his perspective on the integration among biological science, the humanities and social sciences. I obtained my PhD in psychology and have maintained that such departments would be better placed in a school of biology. Anyway, I monitor my reading with my bias towards more vitalistic conceptions and generally disagree with how some phenomena are viewed through a mechanistic metaphor. I found this same old quibble in chapter 9. Here I reacted strongly to Dr. Wilson’s statement that “The mind will be more precisely explained as an epiphenomenon of the neuronal machinery of the brain“. And there I find my difference. Reminding myself from Merriam-Webster that an ‘epiphenomon’ results from other processes and has no causal power, I bring up my usual questionable quibble: Is the mind only a secondary result that can exert no causal power, i.e., an epiphenomenon, or does the mind primarily cause some things, i.e., a phenomenon?

If you have followed this blog I hope you know that I see the mind as the latter, an exceedingly important (to us anyway) phenomenon with a special sense and agency of specific focus. In this I do not discount the evidence from meditation, hypnosis, pain, relief and, dare I say it, placebo medicine, even as I focus on the social emotions, empathic connection and symbolic communication. Memes are mental, mindful productions beyond the epiphenomenal limits, as are art and other sorts of presentational symbols (and I won’t address discursive symbols right now). It is easy to see that the mind has some power.

Some may quibble that mindful actions are determined and not free. In this I follow William James that his first act of free will is to assert that he has free will. Some may quibble that the underlying neurological processes do all the work, not the conscious (embodied) mind itself. In this I follow W.B. Yeats’ final couplet in Among School Children,

Oh body swayed to music, oh brightening glance,

How can we know the dancer from the dance?

And I follow Dr. Langer who certainly taught that understanding life’s vitality in our embodied mind is important to our understanding of human mentality, which brings us back to my usual quibble that remembering and conceptualizing our brains as organically vital is important and that a mechanistic view forgets this along the way, i.e., is an increasingly inept way of seeing the phenomena. While our brain does operate very rapid processes through the quantum discharge of electrical potentials, these pulses are in the service of controlling chemical (hormonal and oh, so many neurotransmitters) release and re-uptake, that then go on to manage the rather isomorphic electrical impulses. A beautiful arrangement with very few, if indeed any, hardwires. So look back at the connectome and see a wonderful soup with small, brief lightning flashes continuing to mix it up. Delicious!

Often I close by saying, “Travel on,” but this seems a lovely place to rest and let it cook for a bit.

mysteries 4.1

Just to be clear about my favorite mysteries cited again in the last post, the origin of life and the beginnings of intellect (and so our humanity) in lower animals. Didn’t Darwin see beyond the facts (a lot of them too) to some very helpful and thus enduring truth? One facet of our humanity is our fascination with mysteries. This fascination is also a mystery because we fabricate them in our minds, i.e., the interior of the MEMBRAIN, so why are they mysteries, as opposed to unknown but knowable or the unknowable? The mysteries explored by ancient peoples were mainly deemed unknowable until the Enlightenment, when we began to develop a more intellectual understanding of our earth, our universe and ourselves, empirically based, treasuring errors and their correction, and providing an increasingly powerful basis for interacting with our world. The unknowable shrank and the knowable grew fatter. I like my favorite mysteries because they pose questions whose answers are unknown but knowable and because how we do answer them can lead back to the ancient thread of all mysteries, well articulated by William James, the mystic experience, our sense of what lies beyond the North wind, our sensory experience which we can only apprehend but do not and maybe cannot comprehend, the prime unknowable.

So to be clear about where these mysteries originate, here is a rough diagram of mine.


From the 4/17/15 post:

“Call the body of any organism its soma; to remain vital a soma must ingest food, etc. Organisms with somas in which brains have evolved have been quite successful—they have spread, grown larger and more complex. While much of the brain remains dedicated to somatic vitality, certain parts have evolved to form what I call the MEMBRAIN of the mind. These structures surround and create a virtual interiority, larger on the inside than outside, constructed with information old and new”.

Somas exist ‘for’ genetic transmittance and they exist by metabolism; they take in nutrients, use them, vent the wastes and move around to sustain and replicate. All of this is done in real, i.e., immediate, present or non-displaced, time. Somas with brains begin the sentient evolution powered by the nervous system’s transduction of ambient energies and guidance toward or away from what is out there, all very much in service to their somas. This is the basis for an embodied mind, the organic one, the one with an inherent, not external, power source. From the beginning the transduction of ambient energies leads to displacement, i.e., they are transformed to be processed as old/new information. Nervous processes involve at least this displacement of information.

Now, according to my way of thinking, the MEMBRAIN evolved as the embodied self was able to co-opt sentient processes independently of the current ambient and process information autogenically (to use Langer’s term) or autonomously (to use another term). MEMBRAINs began with recognition (new becomes old) and recall (old becomes new) and then, with the social opportunity of intimacy increasing, moved on to symbolic formulation and control and communication of the interiority. So where are these so called mysteries?

Well, they exist within the MEMBRAIN’s interiority but they arise between MEMBRAINs, in their interstitial communication back and forth, so to speak. This highlights, perhaps, that the unknowable mysteries are the limit of consciousness in apprehending the present embodiment of the mind and the limit preventing us from apprehending what is in another’s mind. And somewhere between these two limits, these two mysteries, we find the mystic sense. Travel on.